Is There a Woman in This Text?
Mary Jacobus L ET ME start with an anecdote. Readers of Stanley Fish's Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretative Communities (1980) will recognize in my title an allusion to the anecdote which gives him his. It's also, appropriately enough, an interpretative joke (though at whose expense is not immediately clear); and, since it involves the triangulation of two men and a woman, a joke that falls structurally into a category defined by Freud as at once seductive and aggressive. Seductive, because you'll recall that for Freud this is always the aim of the sexual joke directed at a woman; aggressive, because the presence of another man turns desire to hostility, enlisting the originally interfering third party as an ally. The function of this kind of joke is both to humiliate and to eliminate the woman, becoming a joke at the precise point when it is directed no longer at her but at the onlooker-turned-listener.' Here, then, is Fish's anec-joke, which involves two male professors of differing critical persuasions and a female student whose theoretical innocence has already been violated by one of them:
On the first day of the new semester a colleague at Johns Hopkins University was approached by a student who, as it turned out, had just taken a course from me. She put to him what I think you would agree is a perfectly straightforward question: "Is there a text in this class?" Responding with a confidence so perfect that he was unaware of it (although in telling the story, he refers to this moment as "walking into the trap"), my colleague said, "Yes; it's the Norton Anthology of Literature," whereupon the trap (set not by the student but by the infinite capacity of language for being appropriated) was sprung: "No, no," she said, "I mean in this class do we believe in poems and things, or is it just us?"2 particular, to her remarkable oral cavity-in order that Freud's solution to the secret of dreams may be swallowed by his readers. One might say that the wish fulfilled by this dream is that dreams should be the fulfillment of wishes.
Like Fish's anec-joke, Freud's dream can be misread as an example of the role frequently played by women in a theoretical context. It's no part of my purpose to indict "theory" as such-on the contrary; still less to imply, as some feminist critics have tended to do, that theory is of itself "male," a dangerous abstraction which denies the specificity of female experience and serves chiefly to promote men in the academy. Instead, I want to offer some thoughts about the relation between women and theory-about the deflection of gender harassment (aggression against the class of women) or sexual harassment (aggression against the bodies of women) onto the "body" of the text. The result might be called textual harassment, the specular appropriation of woman, or even her elimination altogether. It's not just that women figure conveniently as mirrors for acts of narcissistic selfcompletion on the part of some male theorists, or that the shutting-up of a female "victim" can open theoretical discourse. It's also a matter of the adversarial relation between rival theorists which often seems to underlie a triangle such as the one in Fish's anecdote. This triangle characteristically invokes its third (female) term only in the interests of the original rivalry and works finally to get rid of the woman, leaving theorist and theorist face to face. My first extended example of the textual relation between a woman and a theory will be Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's Gradiva (1907), Freud's reading of afin de siecle novella. Painstaking yet wishful, Freud's practice is a reminder that the word theory comes from the Greek verb to look on, view, or contemplate, and that self-regard can never be far away in such a context. My second example will center on Mary Shelley's Frankenstein (1818), and especially on Frankenstein's uncreation of his female monster, while drawing on a theoretical debate which similarly has as its focus the elimination of the woman. Finally, I'll return briefly to another way of asking the question "Is there a woman in this text?" in order to relocate it within current feminist critical theory-putting the question back where it belongs for feminist critics themselves.
I. Gradiva Rediviva
Then thou our fancy of itself bereaving, Dost make us Marble with too much conceaving ...
Milton, "On Shakespear"
Recognizing the violence done by Freud to the literary text in the interests of analytical "truth," Sarah Kofman writes in Quatre romans analytiques (1973) of the impossibility of analytic interpretation without counter-transference; "the unconscious of the analysis, like that of everyone, can never be eliminated."4 What form does this countertransference take in the case of Freud's analysis of Jensen's "Pompeian phantasy," Gradiva? Freud himself was bound to read it in the light of his own theories, but did he also read his theories into it?5 As it happens, he was himself alert to the possibility of having found in Jensen's "phantasy" only what he wanted to find: "Is it not rather we who have slipped into this charming poetic story a secret meaning very far from its author's intentions?" (IX, 43). If so, then he is implicated in the same delusional structure as Jensen's archeologist hero-guilty of "introducing into an innocent work of art purposes of which its creator had no notion," and demonstrating "once more how easy it is to find what one is looking for" (IX, 91).6 Constructing an elaborate theory on the basis of his delusion, the young archeologist not only finds what he's looking for, but-and this is his chief value for Freud-reveals the artist-neurotic within the scientific scholar. In this sense (like Gradiva's own therapeutic dealings with the deluded hero), Freud's treatment of the novella might be said to take up the same "ground" as the delusion itself. For Kofman, in fact, the hero's "cure" at the hands of Gradiva parallels Freud's cure of the text-a cure whereby literature is ultimately consigned to the status of delusion, becoming a mere device "for catching the carp truth: that of the literary text which must confirm that of psychoanalysis."7 Against his own better practice, Kofman argues, Freud is forced to align himself with the metaphysics of logocentricity-with "truth" as opposed to "fiction." But perhaps there is another way of looking at the analytical counter-transference at work in Delusions and Dreams. Freud's reading of Jensen's "phantasy" proceeds by means of a series of important but unstated parallels between the role of Gradiva herself and that of the literary text, between the relation of a marble image to a living woman or of "fiction" to real life. Above all, the doubling of Gradiva and text bears on another unstated parallel, between "woman" and "theory."
One might start by asking what are the resemblances between Norbert Hanold, the young archeologist, and Freud himself. Jensen's hero is at once a "scientist" and a fantasist; his archeological obsession provides the basis for a delusion at odds with rational judgment and empirical realities, so that the original instrument of repression (archeology, or "science" itself) becomes the vehicle for the return of the repressed. Defending himself against Eros, or life, Hanold becomes preoccupied with an ancient bas-relief of a young girl whom he iden-tifies as being of Hellenic origin and names "Gradiva" or "the girl who steps along" (after the war god Mars Gradivus, "striding into battle"), an allusion to her distinctive lift of the foot. Norbert Hanold, we're told, "took no interest in living women; the science of which he was the servant had taken that interest away from him and displaced it on to women of marble or bronze" (IX, 45-46). His fixation on a buried past and his unconscious mourning for the lost erotic possibilities of the present are vividly symbolized by a dream of her transformation from a living woman, stepping along with her characteristic gait, into a recumbent marble form buried by the ashes of Vesuvius. Freud's own relation to his "science" has something in common with Hanold's. "The author of The Interpretation of Dreams," he writes, "has ventured, in the face of the reproaches of strict science, to become a partisan of antiquity and superstition" (IX, 7). Whereas "strict science" explains dreaming as a purely physiological process, the imaginative writer sides with the ancients, with the superstitious public, and with Freud himself to recognize "a whole host of things between heaven and earth of which our philosophy has not yet let us dream" (IX, 8). The ghost of Hamlet's murdered father becomes evidence for the uncanny power of the repressed-the unconscious itself, with its challenge to a materialist outlook. For Freud too, "science" becomes at once the instrument of repression and the means by which it is overcome. What returns is "life," or "Zoe"-the Greek name given by Jensen to his flesh-and-blood Gradiva; for the sculpted girl has a living double. Like the young archeologist, who "had surrendered his interest in life in exchange for an interest in the remains of classical antiquity and who was now brought back to real life by a roundabout path which was strange but perfectly logical" (IX, 10), a physiologically based science is revivified by what one might call the buried life of the mind. Hence Freud's identification with his hero's growing impatience at a science unable to carry him back into the buried past of Pompeii: "What [science] taught was a lifeless, archeological way of looking at things, and what came from its mouth was a dead, philological language" (IX, 16). Like the real-life Zoe's father, Hanold has been something of an "archaeopteryx"-a "compromise idea," Freud suggests, by which Zoe wittily satirizes both her father and her oblivious lover, identifying them with "the bird-like monstrosity which belongs to the archeology of zoology" (IX, 33). Zoe's father, whom we see in hot pursuit of the lizardfaraglionensis amidst the ruins of Pompeii, has preferred the taxonomy of zoology to life itself; both he and Hanold, up till now, have been "absorbed by science and held apart by it from life and from Zoe" (IX, 33). In a comically deluded mo-ment, Hanold addresses the unlooked-for noontide apparition of Gradiva in Greek and Latin, forgetting, as he has done all along, that she is "a German girl of flesh and blood" (IX, 18) ; what comes from the mouth of science is a dead philological language. Ostensibly, the incident shows that "his science was now completely in the service of his imagination" (IX, 18). But it also raises a problem which Freud too must address in appropriate words. No less than Zoe's father, he runs the risk of becoming a taxonomist of life or, like Norbert Hanold, a strict scientist locked into a deadening technical vocabulary. As he embarks on the second, analytic phase of his reading of Jensen's novella in the light of his theories of dreams, neurosis, and therapy, we find Freud anxious to "repeat" or "reproduce" it "in correct psychological technical terms," "with the technical terminology of our science" (IX, 47, 44). Yet he is dissatisfied with the taxonomy of mental illness available to him-"erotomania," "fetishism," "degener," and the like-because "all such systems of nomenclature and classification of the different kinds of delusion ... have something precarious and barren about them" (IX, 45). The "strict psychiatrist" who would investigate Hanold's delusion in terms of heredity and degeneracy must give way to the student of the imagination, allied to artist and neurotic, and ultimately to Zoe herself, since her wooing of the young archeologist from his delusion is the model for Freud's own wooing of science.
If the story of Norbert Hanold's awakening to life and love provides Freud with an analogy for the awakening of "strict psychiatry" to the existence of the unconscious, Delusions and Dreams also reveals a submerged concern with what might be called questions of mimesis; that is, with the relation between art object and observed life, the fidelity of literature to psychic laws and processes, and the status of the imagination itself in relation to Freudian theory. The central donnee of Jensen's "Pompeian phantasy" is "the far-reaching resemblance between the sculpture and the live girl" (IX, 42), the improbable "premiss that Zoe was in every detail a duplicate of the relief" (IX, 70), the coincidence of there existing in antiquity a bas-relief which perfectly represents the appearance, and especially the characteristic walk, of a young girl ofJin de siecle Germany. Another donnee, equally unlikely, is that Zoe's family name, "Bertgang," might readily suggest translation as "Gradiva"; fantastically, Freud allows himself to speculate that Zoe's family may be of ancient descent, having earned their name from their womenfolk's distinctive way of walking (IX, 42). The peculiarity here doesn't lie in the fact of Hanold's repressed erotic feelings for his forgotten childhood playmate (for that is what she turns out to be) having settled unknowingly on her marble likeness. Rather, it lies Ostensibly, Freud's answer is to assert its mimetic accuracy-Jensen's novella is "so faithfully copied from reality that we should not object if Gradiva were described not as a phantasy but as a psychiatric study" (IX, 41). Yet it is important to remember the earlier moment in Freud's account when the apparition of Gradiva amidst the ruins of Pompeii produces an experience of confusion and uncertainty, not only for Hanold but for the reader, forcing the conclusion that she is either "a hallucination or a midday ghost" (IX, 17). The unexpected discovery that-whether rediviva or not-she is corporeally present introduces the element of the uncanny, literally marking the return of the repressed. In his retelling of the story, Freud halts us here. The pause is significant, for both Gradiva and the text are alike in being uncanny, not because they are dead but because they are alive-living embodiments of desire. In Jensen's and Freud's texts, then, the uncanny moment occurs when what is supposed dead (Gradiva or science) comes to life again as "Zoe" or "theory."
While seeming to test Jensen's "phantasy" against reality, Freud ends by suggesting that what is uncanny about his science of the mind (as about the unconscious) is that it is something we have always known but have forgotten, just as Hanold has forgotten his childhood playmate. Ostensibly, theory turns out to be life itself. But in the context of Gradiva's apparition in the streets of Pompeii, Freud has earlier asked whether the author intends to leave us in a world "governed by the laws of science" or to transport us into an imaginary one (IX, 17). Though he asserts that Jensen's story obeys the laws of science, these laws have a curious provenance. Like the resemblance of Gradiva and Zoe, the coincidence of Hanold's meeting with Gradiva in Pompeii, the very place to which he has fled in his unconscious avoidance of Eros, is represented as an illustration of "the fatal truth that has laid it down that flight is precisely an instrument that delivers one over to what one is fleeing from" (IX, 42). As for the transporting of Zoe herself from Germany to Pompeii, this is merely an instance of the author guiding his characters "towards a happy destiny, in spite of all the laws of necessity" (IX, 69); part, as it were, of the dream-and we know that Freud has throughout derived his "rules ... for the solution of dreams" from his own Interpretation of Dreams (IX, 57). Not only is there no such thing as chance, but "the laws of science" or mental life turn out to be uniquely authorized. 
II. The Bride of Frankenstein
Many and long were the conversations between Lord Byron and Shelley, to which I was a devout but nearly silent listener. During one of these, various philosophical doctrines were discussed, and among others the nature of the principle of life, and whether there was any probability of its ever being discovered and communicated. For Norbert Hanold, science becomes a discarded, unlovely mistress, or "an old, dried up, tedious aunt, the dullest and most unwanted creature in the world" (IX, 65). Something similar happens to "Rosy" in The Double Helix; at once virago and dowd, she is represented as the sour spinster science by which theory knows itself young and virile. Not content with stressing her lack of feminine desirability-the absence of lipstick or attractive clothes-Watson speculates that she is "the product of an unsatisfied mother who unduly stressed the desirability of professional careers that could save bright girls from marriages to dull men" (p. 20); how unlike Zoe. Later, giving an important talk on DNA (whose implications Watson was at that point in no position to understand), she is represented as the product of "careful, unemotional crystallographic training," and hence as hostile to the idea of using "tinker-toy-like structures" for solving theoretical problems in biology. As she calls for more refined crystallographic analysis, Watson labels her the schoolmarm "labwork": "Certainly," he recalls, "a bad way to go out into the foulness of a heavy, foggy November night was to be told by a woman to refrain from venturing an opinion about a subject for which you were not It's not just that the exclusion of woman from creation symbolically "kills" the mother, but that Frankenstein's forbidden researches give to the "facts of life" the aspect of mortality. Elizabeth in turn comes to represent not the object of desire but its death. In a bizarre pun, the monster-"the demonical corpse to which I had so miserably given life"-is compared to "a mummy again endued with animation" (p. 58). Exchanging a woman for a monster, Frankenstein has perhaps preferred monstrosity to this vision of corrupt female flesh. From this moment on, the narrative must move inexorably towards the elimina- In Mary Shelley's novel, intense identification with an oedipal conflict exists at the expense of identification with women. At best, women are the bearers of a traditional ideology of love, nurturance, and domesticity; at worst, passive victims. And yet, for the monster himself, women become a major problem (one that Frankenstein largely avoids by immersing himself in his scientific studies). A curious thread in the plot focuses not on the image of the hostile father (Frankenstein/God) but on that of the dead mother who comes to symbolize to the monster his loveless state. Literally unmothered, he fantasizes acceptance by a series of women but founders in imagined rebuffs and ends in violence. Though it is a little boy (Frankenstein's younger brother) who provokes the monster's first murder by his rejection, the child bears the fatal image of the mother-the same whose shroud had crawled with grave worms in Frankenstein's nightmare:
As I fixed my eyes on the child, I saw something glittering on his breast: I took it; it was a portrait of a most lovely woman. In spite of my malignity, it softened and attracted me. For a few moments I gazed with delight on her dark eyes, fringed by deep lashes, and her lovely lips; but presently my rage returned: I remembered that I was for ever deprived of the delights that such beautiful creatures could bestow; and that she whose resemblance I contemplated would, in regarding me, have changed that air of divine benignity to one expressive of disgust and affright.
Can you wonder that such thoughts transported me with rage? (P. 143)
Immediately after the monster has his vision of this lovely but inaccessible woman, shifting in imagination from looks of benignity to disgust, he finds the Frankensteins' servant girlJustine asleep in a nearby barn: "She was young: not indeed so beautiful as her whose portrait I held; but of an agreeable aspect, and blooming in the loveliness of youth and health. Here, I thought, is one of those whosejoy-imparting smiles are bestowed on all but me. And then I bent over her, and whispered, 'Awake, fairest, thy lover is near-he who would give his life but to obtain one look of affection from thine eyes: my beloved, awake!'" (p. 143). But in this travesty of the lover's aubade, the beloved's awakening will shatter the dream, so she must sleep forever. On Justine's person the monster wreaks his revenge on all women, planting among her clothes the incriminating evidence of the mother's portrait as the supposed motive for her murder of the little boy. She is duly tried and executed, even confessing to the crime-for in the monstrous logic of the text, she is as guilty as the monster claims: "The crime had its source in her: be hers the punishment!" (p. 144). In this bizarre parody of the Fall, Eve is to blame for having been desired. By the same monstrous logic, if woman is the cause of the monster's crimes, then the only cure is a mate, "one as horrible and deformed as myself" (p. 144). The monster's demand for a mate provides the basis for James Whale's sequel. In The Bride of Frankenstein, Frankenstein and his crazed collaborator Dr. Pretorius undertake what neither Mary Shelley nor her hero could quite bring themselves to do-embody woman as fully monstrous. Shelley's Frankenstein gives several different reasons for dismembering the female corpse which he is on the point of animating: that she might prove even more Fig. 3. Raphael (1483-1520) , The Fall, Vatican Apartments. ? Princeton U. P. malignant than her mate; that between them they might breed a race of monsters to prey on mankind; and that "they might even hate each other"-he loathing her for a deformity worse than his because it "came before his eyes in the female form," while "she also might turn in disgust from him to the superior beauty of man" (p. At this juncture it seems appropriate to return to the Girardian triangle and to Sarah Kofman's reading of Freud-in particular, to the Girard-Kofman argument over the narcissistic woman. Since the narcissistic woman currently enjoys some vogue as the point of resistance both to specular appropriation by male desire and to the phallocentric system whereby the term woman is reduced to man-minus, denying sexual difference, the argument is worth recapitulating.22 Perhaps, too, the stakes are not quite what they seem. The theory of narcissism itself-an almost tautologous concept, given the reflexivity of looking at looking at oneself as a love object-finds an apt emblem in this self-involved figure, who comes to represent for Girard the illusion at the center of Freud's theory, and for Freud himself, the barely repressed possibility that all love might turn out, at bottom, to be narcissistic. In "On Narcissism: an Introduction" (1914), Freud allows himself to speculate about a female type which he calls "the purest and truest one" (XIV, 88), a type who achieves the "self-sufficiency" of loving only herself. According to Freud, such women exercise a special attraction because-like children, cats, large beasts of prey, criminals, and "humorists"-they seem to have kept intact an original, primary narcissism which the adult male has lost. Her fascination is that of representing a lost paradise of narcissistic completeness, while leaving the lover forever unsatisfied. For once, Freud defines woman not in terms of lack but in terms of something she has; primary narcissism replaces the missing phallus. In Kofman's reading, the narcissistic woman is important because she refutes Freud's tendency elsewhere to reduce the "enigma" of woman to categories of penis envy, castration, and veiling. But, she writes, what is frightening about such a woman is "woman's indifference to man's desire, her self-sufficiency ... this is what makes her enigmatic, inaccessible, impenetrable."23 And so Freud must finally redeem her, by way of pregnancy and motherhood, for the ethical superiority of object love. For Girard, however, the narcissistic woman had never been anything but a phantasmatic projection on Freud's part. Her self-sufficiency is an illusion, the strategy of a coquette aware that desire attracts desire, merely "the metaphysical transformation of the rival-model."24 Failing to recognize the mimetic essence of desire, Freud has allowed himself to be entrapped by a woman. In Kofman's eyes, Girard is responding to the intolerable idea of female self-sufficiency (as Freud himself does elsewhere) by denigrating it. But there is more at stake. Girard contends not simply that Freud is entrapped by a fantasy but that his entire theory of narcissism is a chimera. Freud's status as the theorist of desire is undermined in order to reduce narcissism to a merely mythical disguise for Girardian strife between doubles; eliminating the narcissistic woman, Girard also eliminates sexual difference, since in his scheme there is only male desire which the woman mimics. If the narcissistic woman stands, Eve-like, at the center of Freud's theory of desire, Girard's is the James Whale-like scenario of her destruction. What is left without her is the collaboration of Frankenstein and Dr. Pretorius-or, if you like, a struggle for primacy between Freud and Girard in which Girard employs Proust as his front man, using the metaphors of A la recherche du temps perdu to prove that Proust not only understood desire better than Freud but that he demystifies the concepts which buttress the theory of narcissism. The artist knows better than the scientist, for all his technical terms. There is a familiar ring to this. Freud's own arguments-about Jensen's Gradiva, for instance-are marshaled by Girard to prove the superiority of literary insight over scientific; Proust, moreover, doesn't really stand alone, since in this Freud himself supports him. But if all Girard wants to do is assert the primacy of the literary text as a source of theory, why his onslaught on the narcissistic woman? To start with, she is easier to unveil than Freudian theory; her coquettish self-sufficiency can stand in for its formidable appearance of wholeness. But in addition, her elimination allows the literary text (Proust's) or the critical text (Girard's) to enjoy unmediated dialogue with the psychoanalytic text. Girard's final contention is not that Freud needs the narcissistic woman but that Freud and Proust (or rather, Girard) need one another: "a dialogue between the two, a dialogue of equals that has never occurred so far." But just as the monster comes finally to dominate Frankenstein, Girard has in mind something other than equality: "After countless Freudian readings of Proust, we can propose, for a change, a Proustian reading of Freud."25 Next we will have the spectacle of the monster lamenting the destruction of his maker; for to destroy the loved and hated rival is to destroy what is, for Girard himself, the very essence of desire. In Freud's reading of Gradiva, theory steals a march on the literary text which it invokes as proof of its rightness. In Girard's reading of Freud, the literary text usurps on theory-to reveal theory once more. The play of desire proves to be a power play; but either way, the name of the game is theoretical priority. Freud's tendency to suggest, despite himself, not that theory is life but rather that life is always theory, has some bearing on the narcissism debate. The threat posed by the narcissistic woman is that she may reveal the primacy of narcissism, undercutting object love and mimetic desire alike. Perhaps the ultimate function of both "life" (Zoe) and the narcissistic woman is to defend against formlessness; indeed, one might speculate that this is the chief function of woman as such in theoretical discourse. Just as the threat of castration may localize an anxiety less unmanageable than that glimpsed in the abyss of Irma's throat-the formless depths of female sexuality-so representing theory as a woman may defend against the indeterminacy and impenetrability of theory itself. It is better to be threatened by even a female monster than to be possessed by a theory whose combined insubstantiality and self-sufficiency are those of delusion. The so-called theorist's dilemma may be one source of the difficulty: if a theory serves its purpose, it should establish relationships among observable phenomena, yet if these relationships are so established, theory can be dispensed with. The dispensability of a good theory has as its obverse Hegel's contention that the innovation of theory is to transform an ungraspable reality into something representable. 26 By contrast, the French insistence on ecriture fminine-on woman as a writing-effect instead of an origin-asserts not the sexuality of the text but the textuality of sex. Gender difference, produced, not innate, becomes a matter of the structuring of a genderless libido in and through patriarchal discourse. Language itself would at once repress multiplicity and heterogeneity-true difference-by the tyranny of hierarchical oppositions (man/woman) and simultaneously work to overthrow that tyranny by interrogating the limits of meaning. The "feminine," in this scheme, is to be located in the gaps, the absences, the unsayable or unrepresentable of discourse and representation. 29 The feminine text becomes the elusive, phantasmal inhabitant of phallocentric discourse, as Gradiva rediviva haunts Freud's Delusions and Dreams, or, for the skeptical Girard, the narcissistic woman exercises her illusory power over the theory of narcissism. And yet, in its claim that women must write the body, that only the eruption of femalejouissance can revolutionize discourse and challenge the Law of the Father, ecriture feminine seems-however metaphorically-to be reaching not so much for essentialism (as it is often accused of doing) as for the conditions of representability. The theoretical abstraction of a "marked" writing that can't be observed at the level of the sentence but only glimpsed as an alternative libidinal economy almost invariably gives rise to gender-specific images of voice, touch, anatomy, to biologistic images of milk orjouissance. How else, after all, could the not-yet-written forms of ecriture fminine represent themselves to our understanding? Not essentialism but representationalism is the French equivalent to Anglo-American empiricism-an alternative response to the indeterminacy and impenetrability of theory. If the woman in the text is "there," she is also "not there"-certainly not its object, not necessarily even its author. That may be why the heroine of feminist critical theory is not the silenced Irma, victim of Freudian theory, but the hysterical Dora whose body is her text and whose refusal to be the object of Freudian discourse makes her the subject of her own. Perhaps the question that feminist critics should be asking themselves is not "Is there a woman in this text?" but rather: "Is there a text in this woman?" 
